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Editorial
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views on firms' investment and finance decisions".  Papers presented at this
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1. Introduction
In an increasingly uncertain and dynamic global market place managerial flexibility
has become essential for firms to successfully take advantage of favorable future investment
opportunities, respond effectively to technological changes or competitive moves, or
otherwise limit losses from adverse market developments.  Thinking of future investment
opportunities as “real options”  has provided powerful new insights that in many ways
revolutionized  modern corporate resource allocation.  Real options emphasizes the
importance of waiting or staging flexibility, suggesting that managers should either “wait
and see” until substantial uncertainty is resolved and the project is more clearly successful,
requiring a premium over the zero-NPV critical value, or they should stage the decision so
that they can revise the situation at critical milestones to either proceed to the next stage
or abandon. During the waiting or staging period, new information can be revealed that
might affect the desirability of the project; if future developments turn out worse than
expected, the firm has implicit insurance protecting it against downside losses by choosing
not to proceed with the project.
Real options also introduces a new insight with respect to the role and impact of
uncertainty on investment opportunity value that runs counter to conventional thinking.
Since management is asymmetrically positioned to capitalize fully on upside opportunities
while it can limit losses on the downside, more uncertainty can be beneficial for option
value. More can be gained from opportunities in highly uncertain or volatile markets because
of the exceptional upside potential and limited downside losses that result from
management´s flexibility to continue or not proceed with the project.
From a strategic perspective, of course, it may not always be beneficial to “wait and
see.” For example, by making an early strategic R&D investment, a firm may not only
develop more cost-efficient or higher-quality products or processes that can result in a
sustainable cost or other competitive advantage, but may be able to positively influence
competitive behavior and earn a higher market share down the road. In some cases a firm2 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
anticipating competitive entry may make a strategic investment commitment (e.g., in excess
production capacity) early on such that it can preempt competition altogether. Therefore,
optimal investment timing generally involves a trade-off between wait-and-see flexibility
and the “strategic value” of early commitment. Moreover, early investing may itself open up
a set of new options embedded in the commercial project (e.g., to later expand, abandon,
or switch to alternative uses), whose value may also be enhanced by higher uncertainty,
but is realized through early investing. Thus, the presumed depressive impact of
uncertainty on investment is not that clear cut.  The above new considerations of
investment under uncertainty suggest the need to adopt an expanded or strategic NPV
criterion, able to capture management’s flexibility to alter planned investment decisions as
future market conditions change as well as the strategic value of competitive interactions –
besides the value of expected cash flows from committed assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
some common real options through a comprehensive example. Section 3 discusses briefly
simplifying real-life problems and reducing them to a basic problem structure. What we
know about real options in terms of main insights and implications is discussed in section
4. Section 5 catalogues what we still don´t know that future research must focus more on.
2. Overview of Common Real Options: A Comprehensive Example
The following example involving a mineral resource extraction and processing
facility serves to review many of the most common options encountered in long-term
capital investment opportunities. A large natural resources company has a one-year lease to
start extracting on undeveloped land with potential mineral reserves.  Initiating the project
may require certain exploration costs, to be followed by construction of roads and other
infrastructure outlays. Planned investment outlays are indicated as It, while V t indicates the
value of the project’s expected operating cash flows at time t. The initial investment in
exploration is I0, and the investment in roads and other infrastructure in the first period is I1.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  3
This is expected to be followed by capital outlays, I2, for the construction of a new processing
facility. Extraction can begin only after construction is completed, i.e., cash flows are
generated only during the operating stage that follows the last outlay.  During construction, if
market conditions deteriorate, management can choose to forego future planned outlays past
the current stage.  Management may also choose to reduce the scale of operation by c%,
saving a portion, IC, of the last outlay (I2) if the market is weak.
The processing plant can also be designed up front such that, if mineral prices turn out
unexpectedly high, the rate of production can be enhanced by x% with a follow-up outlay of IE
to install extra capacity.  At any time, management may salvage a portion of its investment by
selling the processing plant and equipment for their salvage value or switch them to an
alternative use value, At.  An associated refinery plant --that may be designed to operate with
alternative sources of energy inputs -- can convert the raw mineral into a variety of refined by-
products.  This type of project has embedded in it the following package of real options:
1.  The option to defer investment.
The lease enables management to defer investment for up to one year and benefit
from the resolution of uncertainty about mineral prices during this period.
Management would invest I 1 (i.e., exercise its option to extract the mineral) only if
mineral prices are sufficiently high, but would not commit to the project, saving the
planned outlays, if prices decline.  Just before expiration of the lease, the value added
will be the greater of the net value created (that is, V1 - I1) or $0, with value-added
represented as max (V1 - I 1, $0).  The option to defer is thus analogous to an
American call option on the gross present value of the completed project's expected
operating cash flows, V1, with the exercise price being equal to the required outlay, I1.
Since early investment implies sacrificing the option to wait, this option value loss is
like an additional investment opportunity cost, justifying investment only if the value of
cash benefits, actually exceeds the initial outlay by a substantial premium. The option4 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
to wait is particularly valuable in such resource extraction industries, as well as in
farming, paper products, and real estate development due to high uncertainties and
long investment horizons.
2.  The option to abandon staged investment.
In most real-life projects, the required investment is not incurred as a single up-front
outlay. The actual staging of capital investment as a series of outlays over time
creates valuable options to abandon at any given stage (e.g., after exploration if the
reserves or mineral prices turn out very low).  Thus, each stage (e.g., building
necessary infrastructure) can be viewed as an option on the value of subsequent
stages by incurring the next cost outlay (e.g., I1) required to proceed to the next stage,
and can therefore be valued similar to compound options.  This option is valuable in
all R & D intensive industries, especially pharmaceuticals, in highly uncertain, long-
development capital-intensive industries, such as energy-generating plants or large-
scale construction, high-tech start ups and venture capital.
3.  The option to expand.
If mineral prices or other market conditions turn out more favorable than expected,
management can accelerate the rate or expand the scale of production (by x%) by
incurring a follow-up cost outlay (IE).  This is similar to a call option to acquire an
additional part (x%) of the base-scale project, paying I E as exercise price.  The
investment opportunity with the option to expand can be viewed as the base-scale
project plus a call option on future investment [i.e., V + max(xV - I E, 0)].  Given an
initial design choice, management may purposefully select a more expensive
technology with a built-in flexibility to expand production if and when it becomes
desirable.  As discussed further below, the option to expand may also be of strategic
importance, particularly if it enables the firm to capitalize on new or future marketNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  5
growth opportunities. When the firm buys vacant undeveloped land, or when it builds
a flexible plant in a new geographic location (domestic or overseas) to position itself to
take advantage of a developing  potentially-large market, it essentially installs an
expansion or growth option.  This option, which will be exercised only if future market
developments turn out favourable, but not otherwise, can oftentimes make a
seemingly unprofitable (based on passive NPV) base-case investment worth
undertaking.
4.  The option to contract.
If market conditions turn out weaker than originally expected, management can
operate below capacity or even reduce the scale of operations (by c%), thereby
saving part of the planned investment outlays (IC).  This flexibility to mitigate loss is
analogous to a put option on part (c%) of the base-scale project, with exercise price
equal to the potential cost savings (IC), giving max(IC - cV, $0).  The option to contract,
just as the option to expand, may be particularly valuable in the case of new product
introductions in uncertain markets.  The option to contract may also be important in
choosing among technologies or plants with a different construction to maintenance
cost mix, where it may be preferable to build a plant with lower initial construction
costs and higher maintenance expenditures in order to acquire the flexibility to
contract operations by cutting down on maintenance if market conditions turn out
unfavourable.
5.  The option to temporarily shut down (and re-start) operations.
In real life, the plant does not have to operate (i.e., extract the mineral) in each and
every period automatically.  In fact, if mineral prices are such that cash revenues are
not sufficient to cover variable operating (e.g., maintenance) costs, it might be better
not to operate temporarily, especially if the costs of switching between the operating6 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
and idle modes are relatively small. If prices rise sufficiently, operations can start
again.  Thus, operation in each year can be seen as a call option to acquire that
year's cash revenues (C) by paying the variable costs of operating (IV) as exercise
price, i.e., max(C - IV, 0). Options to alter the operating scale (i.e., expand, contract, or
shut down) are typically found in natural resource industries, such as mine operations,
facilities planning and construction in cyclical industries, fashion apparel, consumer
goods, and commercial real estate.
6.  The option to abandon for salvage value.
If reserves turn out low, if mineral prices suffer a sustainable decline or the operation
does poorly for some other reason, management does not have to continue incurring
the fixed costs.  Instead, management may have a valuable option to abandon the
project permanently in exchange for its salvage value (i.e., the resale value of its
capital equipment and other assets in second-hand markets). This option can be
valued as an American put option on current project value with exercise price the
salvage or best alternative use value, entitling management to receive
V + max (A - V, 0) or  max(V, A).  Naturally, more general-purpose capital assets
would have a higher salvage and option abandonment value than special-purpose
assets.  Valuable abandonment options are generally found in capital-intensive
industries, such as in airlines and railroads, in financial services, as well as in new
product introductions in uncertain markets.
7.  The option to switch use (e.g., inputs or outputs).
Suppose the associated mineral processing operation can be designed to use
alternative forms of energy inputs (e.g., fuel oil, gas, or electricity) to convert the raw
mineral into a variety of output by-products.  This would provide valuable built-in
flexibility to switch from the current input to the cheapest future input, or from theNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  7
current output to the most profitable future product mix, as the relative prices of the
inputs or outputs fluctuate over time.  In fact, the firm should be willing to pay a certain
positive premium for such a flexible technology over a rigid alternative that confers no
or less flexibility.  Indeed, if the firm can in this way develop more uses for its assets
relative to its competitors, it may be at a significant comparative advantage. Generally,
process flexibility can be achieved not only via technology (e.g., by building a flexible
facility that can switch among alternative energy  inputs), but also by maintaining
relationships with a variety of suppliers, changing the mix as their relative  rates
change. Subcontracting policies may allow further flexibility to contract the scale of
future operations at a low cost in case of unfavourable market developments. A
multinational company may similarly locate production facilities in various countries in
order to acquire the flexibility to shift production to the lowest-cost producing facilities,
as the relative costs, other local market conditions, or exchange rates change over
time.  Process flexibility is valuable in feedstock-dependent facilities, such as oil and
minerals, electric power, chemicals, and crop switching.  Product flexibility, enabling
the firm to switch among alternative outputs, is more valuable in industries such as
automobiles, consumer electronics, toys or pharmaceuticals, where product
differentiation and diversity are important and/or product demand is volatile.  In such
cases, it may be worthwhile to install a more costly flexible capacity to acquire the
ability to alter product mix or production scale in response to changing market
demands.
8.  Corporate growth options.
As noted, another version of the earlier option to expand of considerable strategic
importance are  corporate growth options that set the path of future opportunities.
Suppose, in the above example, that the proposed processing facility is based on a
new, technologically superior process for mineral refinement developed and tested8 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
internally on a pilot plant basis.  Although the proposed facility in isolation may appear
unattractive, it could be only the first in a series of similar facilities if the process is
successfully developed and commercialized, and may even lead to entirely new
mineral by-products. More generally, many early investments (e.g., R & D, a lease on
undeveloped land or a tract with potential oil reserves, a strategic acquisition, or an
information technology network) can be seen as prerequisites or links in a chain of
interrelated projects. The value of these projects may derive not so much from their
expected directly- measurable cash flows, but rather from unlocking future growth
opportunities (e.g., a new-generation product or process, related mineral reserves,
access to a new or expanding market, strengthening of the firm's core capabilities or
strategic positioning). An opportunity to invest in a first-generation high-tech product,
for example, is analogous to an option on options (an inter-project compound option).
Despite a seemingly negative NPV, the infrastructure, experience, and potential by-
products generated during the development of the first-generation product may serve
as spring-boards for developing lower-cost or improved-quality future generations of
that product, or even for generating new applications into other areas.  But unless the
firm makes that initial investment, subsequent generations or other applications would
not even be feasible.  The infrastructure and experience gained can be proprietary
and can place the firm at a competitive advantage, which may even reinforce itself if
learning cost curve effects are present. Growth options are found in all infrastructure-
based or strategic industries, especially in high tech, R & D, or industries with multiple
product generations or applications (e.g., semiconductors, computers,
pharmaceuticals), in multi-national operations, and in strategic acquisitions.
In a more general context, such operating and strategic adaptability represented by
such a set of corporate real options can be achieved at various stages during the
value chain, from switching the factor input mix among various suppliers and
subcontracting practices, to rapid product design and modularity in design, toNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  9
shifting production among various products rapidly and cost-efficiently in a flexible
system or network.
3. Simplifying Real-life Problems
Most real-life problems involve more complex combinations of the above (and
occasionally other) options. However, one can simplify a complex investment/ decision
problem by decomposing it into a few basic building blocks (such as the standard options
in the previous section) connected by some basic decision operations.  The four basic
decision operations commonly encountered are: choice of the best among several
mutually exclusive alternatives (OR), the sum of several (parallel) options (AND), taking
the probabilistic average (AVG) of follow-on options across some technical outcome
scenarios weighted by the corresponding (actual) probabilities, or investing a portion of a
budget in a subset of a range of technological options, and a recursive multi-stage option
on an option (or COMPOUND option). Valuation proceeds in a recurring (even modular)
manner following standard backward risk-neutral option valuation. Exhibit 1 illustrates a
similar basic structure (combination of standard options and decision operators) for two
real-life applications taken from entirely different industries. Powergen involves a staged
powerplant construction (with options to abandon and later expand), while Glaxo involves
valuing R&D during the clinical trials phase and determining the value of the patent rights
for a new drug (also involving abandonment and expansion options into related niches).
The problem structure and related option maps (shown in Exhibit 1) are remarkably similar,
despite differences in problem context and industry characteristics. In both situations each
firm faces a compound or multi-stage option to complete a development process (building
a plant or completing clinical trials), followed by an option to either continue with
commercial operations (also involving a later option to expand) or abandon for a salvage
or sale value.10 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
4. Main Implications: What We Know About Real Options and Investment  Under
Uncertainty
The insight and implications of viewing investment opportunities through a real options
lens can be quite powerful.  Below I summarize a dozen insights or important main
implications of now-standard real options analysis:
1. Uncertainty and flexibility are key determinants of the value of an asset or firm
and call for an expanded valuation criterion.
The traditional valuation paradigm based on cash flows from  expected plans
under the implicit assumption of passive management has proven inadequate.
The role of uncertainty in the presence of managerial flexibility is not necessarily
penalizing as conventional wisdom would have us believe. Greater variability of
potential outcomes around the expected (mean) result may be beneficial in the
presence of options. Managerial flexibility to revise decisions when there are
deviations from the expected plans introduces beneficial asymmetry in the
distribution of project value returns by enabling upside (value-creation)
opportunities to be exploited fully while limiting downside losses by choosing not
to proceed or abandon. The resulting skewing of the probability distribution of
expected project returns toward a more positive outcome calls for an expanded
(strategic) NPV criterion to also capture the additional value of managerial
operating flexibility and other strategic interactions:
Expanded (or Strategic) NPV = passive NPV + Option Premium (ROV)
                                                                                      (Flexibility value + Strategic value)
Based on this expanded criterion, it can be seen that it may now be justified to
accept projects with negative passive NPV of expected cash flows (if this is offset
by a larger option premium or real option value as a result of additional flexibilityNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  11
and strategic value), or delay projects with positive NPV until a later time when
Expanded NPV can be maximized under uncertainty.
2. Managerial flexibility or real option value (ROV) may be higher (other things the
same)
- for industries with higher uncertainty;
- for investment opportunities with longer horizons or that can be delayed longer;
- when (real) interest rates are higher;
- for multi-stage (compound) options.
3. Higher uncertainty tends to increase the value of the option to defer (a single,
irreversible, proprietary) investment  -- provided there are no “dividends” or other
early-exercise benefits, strategic interactions or other embedded options.
The flexibility to delay or “wait and see” enables acquiring more or better
information and making a more informed future decision, potentially avoiding a
mistake from premature investment in case things develop unfavorably. This
higher value to “wait-and-see” necessitates a higher critical investment threshold,
i.e., project value, V, must be at a significant premium above the required
investment cost, I, before investing and sacrificing the option to wait is justified.
The implication of this is that higher uncertainty would presumably lead to
investing less or later (other things the same), with potentially significant
macroeconomic implications. I should caution, however, that this holds under the
provisional statements made above (and relaxed later) and may be different in
different contexts, so it is questionable whether empirical studies on investment
based on macro data can verify the presumed depressive role of uncertainty on
investment (in terms of lower or delayed investment) if the provisional conditions
are not confirmed to be carefully satisfied.12 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
4. If one can reverse a decision (with ease or little cost), it is easier to make it (e.g.,
invest) in the first place.
A multinational corporation would find the decision to enter a new foreign country
easier if it can get out with limited damage in case of unfavorable developments.
This principle holds in general contexts beyond business investment. For
example, the decision to get married might be easier in societies where it is easier
to receive divorce (in Moslem parts of India men could obtain divorce simply by
proclaiming the word 3 times). In deciding whether to move from the US to a
smaller, more risky country, it helps to make the decision if one has US
citizenship rights.  These rights give the individual the option to reverse the
decision and operate in the best of the two countries over time, just as locating
plants in several countries enables a multinational corporation to operate in the
best subset of several countries and shift production from one country to another
to take advantage of fluctuations or differences in exchange rates, labor costs or
other production inputs, tax regimes etc.
5. Under uncertainty, it is prudent to stage an investment or proceed with decision
plans in stages.
Staging the investment or decision plans provides valuable flexibility to continue
to the next stage (receiving the option value from continuing) or to abandon (exit)
midway. Continuation (e.g., financing of subsequent stages in Venture Capital)
should be contingent on the success of earlier stages.
6. Multi-stage opportunities may have significant growth (compound) option value
that may justify making strategic investments despite having negative NPV.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  13
Consider, for example, a two-stage growth option. The first stage involves
investing in a manufacturing facility in Spain to introduce a new product that is
expected to generate moderate cash flows from the Spanish market. The second
stage would involve a 10-fold expansion into the broader European market 3
years later. The first-stage NPV of the expected cash flows from investing in the
Spanish market is negative, and committing now to enter the European market on
an expanded scale seems ten times as bad. But the company does not have to
commit now. Instead, it has an option to “wait and see” how the Spanish and
European demand develops and expand to the European market if and only if it
appears favorable to do so 3 years from now. The opportunity to expand in
Europe, valued as an option, may well offset the negative NPV of the first-stage
investment (in effect the option premium or exercise price that needs to be paid to
acquire the European expansion option) and justify making this strategic multi-
stage investment on strategic grounds.
Empirically, companies in industries with higher uncertainty that involve multi-
stage (compound) options tend to have a higher proportion of their stock price
deriving from growth opportunities (PVGO/P), providing an indirect confirmation of
the validity of real option predictions.
7. If investing creates other options within the project (e.g., to later expand,
abandon, or switch to alternative uses), then more uncertainty would also
increase the flexibility value of these other embedded options –increasing the
value of early investing in the first place. For this reason (and the other reasons
listed below), higher uncertainty would not necessarily suppress or delay
investment.14 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
8. In the presence of competition in an oligopoly setting, early investment may have
strategic value by influencing the equilibrium actions (quantity or price setting) of
competitors in a way beneficial to the investing firm or even by preempting
competitive entry in some cases.  Thus the option value of waiting must be traded
off against the strategic value of early investing.  Again, the impact of higher
uncertainty on investment is not clear cut -- in fact it may not even vary
monotonically with demand as shifts in demand may lead to shifts in the type of
equilibrium games and different market structure outcomes (e.g., from a Nash
duopoly to a Stackelberg leader/follower game or a monopoly) in different
demand zones leading to value discontinuities as a function of demand.
The value of the strategic investment and the optimal competitive strategy (e.g., to
invest now or wait) depends on whether the resulting benefits of the investment
are proprietary or shared and whether they are damaging or benefiting the
competitor, as well as whether competitive reaction is contrarian (opposite to the
action of the investing firm) or reciprocating (similar to the action of the investing
firm).
When the investment benefits are proprietary and the pioneer can get stronger at
the expense of its competitor, it should commit to an early investment
(aggressive) strategy if the competitor’s reaction is contrarian, e.g., if it will retreat
and cut its market share under quantity competition as the pioneer expands its
own market share. However, when the benefits are shared, thereby benefiting the
competitor as well, and a contrarian competitor would respond aggressively, it
should follow a flexible “wait and see” strategy rather than subsidizing an
aggressive competitor while itself paying the full cost. The above can be reversed
under reciprocating (e.g., price) competition. If the benefits are shared and will
benefit a competitor who will reciprocate when treated nicely (e.g., by maintaining
high prices) the optimal strategy might be to invest early but not aggressively. OnNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  15
the contrary, if the benefits are proprietary and will hurt a competitor who will
retaliate by entering into a price war, it may make better sense to wait or not
invest.
9. Competitive pressure may induce firms (e.g., in a  “winner takes all” innovation
race) to invest prematurely resulting in a suboptimal prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Each of the two firms (like prisoners), being afraid that it may be preempted by the
other and loose all (the most severe punishment), would rush to invest
prematurely (give in), rather than wait (hold out) which may be the preferred
outcome.
A joint research venture may enable the two firms to more fully appropriate the
flexibility value from waiting (avoiding the prisoner’s dilemma) by coordinating and
jointly optimizing against demand uncertainty – besides sharing and saving on the
investment cost. A limitation is that in collaborating a firm gives up the possibility
to outwit its rivals and gain a competitive advantage or strategic value over the
other firm.
10. Multiple options embedded in a project may interact, i.e., option value additivity
may break down. The presence of a later option enhances the value of the
underlying asset for a prior option, while exercising an earlier option may alter the
scale of (and in the case of the option to abandon, may extinguish) a later option.
The value of a portfolio or combination of embedded options typically is less than
the sum of separate or independent option values. Therefore, using an analytic
formula like Black-Scholes to determine the value of separate options and then
add them up may be misleading. The error from adding up separate option values
may be of the same order of magnitude –but in the opposite direction - as the16 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
error from ignoring options altogether. That is, a wrongly executed options
analysis can be as dangerous as a naïve NPV analysis.
11. Options to switch (receive the cheapest of several inputs, best of several outputs,
or most profitable countries of operation) provide valuable flexibility and risk
management value.
Traditional mean-variance portfolio theory based on the notion that risk is
undesirable and must therefore be minimized (for a given expected return) is
inadequate; it needs to be extended for portfolios of (potentially interdependent)
options, incorporating higher moments. The flexibility to adjust plans when
deviating from expectations by improving the upside potential while limiting the
downside risk adds skewness (third moment), while potential volatility
dependence on project value, competitive jumps and technological disruptions
may introduce kurtosis (fourth moment).
The very notion and role of risk must also be revisited when flexibility is present.
With options to choose the best of several alternatives (or on the maximum or
minimum of several assets) or options to switch from one “mode” of operation or
being to another, lower correlation tends to increase the relative volatility and
option value of a flexible system. When the value of one alternative drops, an
option to choose the best or switch to another alternative is worth more if the
value of that second alternative tends to increase (i.e., is negatively correlated
with the first).  For this reason, multinational corporations (MNC’s) operating in
several countries would prefer to select the next strategic location (to be added to
the multinational network) so as to have lower correlation (with the existing
structure) not so much in order to diversify and reduce risk, but rather so as to
increase the relative volatility and option value of the flexible network. Risk is not
necessarily something bad to be avoided, but rather can be seen as a window ofNBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  17
opportunity for the more flexible and innovative corporations to create more value
by leveraging on opportunities while limiting losses.
12. When switching among operating “modes” or strategies, the presence of
significant switching costs (e.g., to enter, exit, or shut down) may induce a
“hysteresis,” inertia or delay/lag effect. Even though immediate switching may be
attractive based on short-term cash-flow considerations, it may be long-term
optimal to wait, e.g., due to a high cost or probability of switching back later.
Examples involving hysteresis effects include continuing operation of a currently
unprofitable mine or oil field despite temporarily suppressed prices, the Japanese
auto producers who once they entered the US market in profitable times kept
hanging-on in the US despite incurring losses in subsequent years, lags in hiring
and firing by companies as business moves to an up and down cycle, delays in
seeking divorce despite an unhappy marriage etc. All these cases involve
irreversible or costly-to-reverse decisions which justify delaying a switch for a
while since a re-switch back to the current situation is either infeasible or would
occur only after a costly impairment of infrastructure, goodwill etc.
5. Future Research Focus: What We Still Don´t Know
Despite significant progresses in recent years, some long-standing gaps remain. Here
is my list of ten pending issues that future research must still focus on:
(1)  More actual case applications and tackling real-life implementation issues and
problems.
(2)  Investments (such as in R & D, pilot or market tests, or excavations) that can
generate information and learning (e.g., about the project's prospects) by
extending/adjusting option pricing and risk-neutral valuation with Bayesian analysis or
alternative (e.g., jump) processes.18 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002
(3)  Exploring in more depth endogenous competitive counteractions and a variety of
competitive/market structure and strategic issues using a combination of game
theoretic industrial organization with option valuation tools.
(4)  Modelling better the various strategic and growth options.
(5)  Extending real options in an agency context recognizing that the potential (theoretical)
value of real options may not be realized in practice if managers, in pursuing their
own agenda (e.g., expansion or growth, rather than firm value maximization), misuse
their discretion and do not follow the optimal exercise policies implicit in option
valuation. This raises the need to design proper incentive contracts by the firm (taking
also into account asymmetric information) and develop a more dynamic, option-based
extension of economic value added.
(6)  Recognizing better that real options may interact not only among themselves but with
financial flexibility options as well, and understanding the resulting implications for the
combined, interdependent corporate investment and financing decisions.
(7)  On the practical side, applying real options to the valuation of flexibility in related
areas, such as in competitive bidding, information technology or other platform
investments, international finance options, and so on.
(8)  Using real options to explain empirical phenomena that are amenable to observation
or statistical testing, such as examining empirically whether the management of firms
that are targets for acquisition may sometimes turn down tender offers in part due to
the option to wait in anticipation of receiving better future offers. We also need more
empirical studies to confirm other qualified predictions of options theory, such as the
impact of uncertainty on investment.
(9)  Doing more field or survey studies to test the conformity of theoretical real option
valuation and its implications with management's intuition and experience, as well as
with actual data when available.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  19
(10) Developing a more credible portfolio theory for (possibly interdependent) options
under budget or other constraints that recognizes the potentially beneficial role of
uncertainty in the presence of flexibility to select the best (subset) of [or switch
among] alternatives.  Apply this to address important strategic contexts, such as
management of a portfolio of start-up ventures by a venture capitalist, running a
portfolio of R&D opportunities by a pharmaceutical company, or selection of a subset
of technologies to invest in by a telecom company and dynamic revision of the
subset of invested technologies as uncertainties and their relative merits change
over time.20 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002NBB WORKING PAPER No. 22 - MAY 2002  21
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